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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

“ Demurrer to petition sustained, the plaintiff having failed to show that
the commissioner acted arbitrarily in computing invested capital under
section 207 of the 1917 act.”
The decision, above quoted, in the case of The Feilbach Company v. Frank B.
Niles, collector, was rendered by the United States district court, N. D., Ohio,
W. D., and the quoted somewhat vague language involves an interpretation of
section 210, which is interesting in that it is contrary to the generally accepted
interpretation of the language of that section. This section, it will be remem
bered, was the one that provided for the determination of the amount of excess
profits in cases where the invested capital could not be determined. In such
cases the amount of the deduction (7% or 9% of invested capital) “shall be”
the same as the proportion of the average deduction of representative corpora
tions engaged in a like or similar trade or business.
The foregoing is not a literal quotation, but conveys the idea with fair
accuracy.
The language of section 210 will probably stand as a model of ambiguity,
but after careful analysis, almost everyone concerned reached the conclusion
that its intention was to relieve certain taxpayers from an abnormally high
excess-profits tax, where, for various reasons, the invested capital could not be
determined.
The judge in this decision states it as his opinion that:

"The section under consideration, 210, is one whose provisions are to be
invoked primarily and most generally by the commissioner alone. Very,
very rarely, and under quite extraordinary circumstances, it would seem,
can the action be resorted to as a mode of relief by the taxpayer. The
statute limits resort to it, too, only when the commissioner finds that he
cannot ‘satisfactorily’ ascertain invested capital for the computation of
excess-profits tax under section 207. It would follow that, if the com
missioner or his agents actually computes capital under section 207, his
action should be presumed to exclude any application of section 210, the
burden then being upon the claimant to relief under the provisions of the
latter section to show that the commissioner acted arbitrarily and without
justification. It would be a rare case indeed wherein a court would be
justified in concluding that the commissioner could not ‘satisfactorily’
apply the provisions of section 207 . . . ”

We believe we are not different from most of those having contact with the
acts and opinions of the commissioner, in our disbelief that congress intended
that the provisions of section 210 “are to be invoked primarily and most gen
erally by the commissioner alone.” Having had many experiences wherein the
commissioner, through his subordinates, has made some strange decisions in
“satisfactorily” determining invested capital under the provisions of section
207, where no abnormal conditions were present, we believe that it was never
intended that the commissioner’s satisfaction with his computation of invested
capital precluded a dissatisfied taxpayer from invoking the provisions of
section 210.
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We know that at the time the act of 1917 was made law, section 210 was
regarded as a relief measure to be invoked by such taxpayers as would have
been placed at a serious disadvantage in the payment of excess-profits taxes
out of all proportion to amounts paid by those engaged in a like or similar
business. We know, too, that it was not rarely, nor in extraordinary cases,
that many taxpayers invoked section 210, and with success, when their taxes
computed under section 210 were abnormally high. We believe the word
“satisfactorily” did not imply that the computation if satisfactory to the com
missioner must necessarily be final.
In view of the foregoing reasons and many others, which will undoubtedly
occur to our readers, we find ourselves heartily disagreeing with the opinion of
the court. As to the decision in the case under review, we have no knowledge
of the facts and merits. It is only with his interpretation of the meaning of the
language of section 210 that we are in disaccord.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Distraint is a “proceeding” and collection thereby of income tax for 1917 is
barred by section 250 (d) of the 1921 act five years from the time the return was
filed, and taxpayer may recover payments so enforced. (United States district
court of Massachusetts, Ehrlich et al., Excrs., v. Nichols, collector.)
A trust created was held “intended to take effect in possession or enjoy
ment” at or after settlor’s death, when by its terms the settlor reserved a
qualified right to alter, amend or terminate the trust. (United States district
court of Massachusetts, Hill, Excr. v. Nichols, collector.)
The loss from sale in 1920 of property originally acquired for residential
purposes, which, from the time the owner abandoned it as his residence prior
to March 1, 1913, until the sale was used for renting purposes, in the nature of
a business venture, should be allowed in computing net income. (Circuit
court of appeals, third circuit, Co-executors of Philander C. Knox, v. Heiner,
collector.)
Section 280 of the 1926 act, which provides that the commissioner, in the
same manner as in a case of a deficiency in a tax, shall determine, assess and
collect the liability at law and in equity of a transferee of property of a taxpayer
for a tax imposed upon the taxpayer, was held unconstitutional, as a denial of
due process of law, and as violative of the constitutional provisions vesting
judicial powers only to the courts.
An injunction will lie to enjoin the collection by distraint of taxes assessed
against a transferee of property of a taxpayer, as the liability, if any, of such
transferee is not a tax within the meaning of section 3224 of the revised statutes.
(United States district court, W. D. Kentucky, Owensboro Ditcher and Grader
Co. v. Lucas, collector.)
Invested capital may not be reduced by arbitrary adjustments of deprecia
tion for prior years where the evidence did not establish that depreciation
actually sustained was not charged off. (United States district court, W. D.
Pennsylvania, Maugh & Keenan Storage & Transfer Co., v. Heiner, collector.)
Cost or statutory basis of real estate should be adjusted for depreciation
sustained in computing gain or loss from the sale thereof, under the 1918 and
1921 acts.
Premiums paid by the insured on life insurance policies payable to his
estate, taken out and assigned to a creditor at its request as collateral for a
loan, are not deductible under the 1918 and 1921 acts, from gross income of the
insured, since he is directly or indirectly a beneficiary under the policy. (United
States district court, W. D. Pennsylvania, Edward E. Reick v. Heiner, col
lector.)
No taxable income was realized upon sale or exchange of properties under the
acts of 1916 and 1917, where that received in the exchange had no actual
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market value. (United States district court, N. D. California, S. D., William
B. Bourn, v. John P. McLaughlin, collector.)
Where the actual of an equitable life estate is determinable from definite
facts known at the time of the computation of the tax, mortuary tables based
on probabilities may not be used to ascertain the value of such future interest.
(United States district court of Massachusetts, Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
v. Nichols, collector.)
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